Shadowfetch Linux 4.1.0 «Umbra» · Mission Control
Known issues
The honest caveats for the current ISO. Read this before you install on a machine you depend on.
Current known issues
4.1.0 is the signed ISO; all required prepublish acceptance cases are proven.
The download is Shadowfetch Linux 4.1.0 (shadowfetch-4.1.0-amd64.iso), SHA-256 e19e96302f97e94d5284f8fbef181c9b0e49ca7b746afe5e66e4bc6d5c551f25. The source, package and ISO gates pass against this exact image, built from a tree with nothing uncommitted in it. All 17 required prepublish acceptance cases are proven against this ISO: 13 pass and 4 are waived with recorded reasons (the two Grok Bot cases and the resource and stress pair, each account-gated in the QA host). Both in-place upgrade paths (3.5 to 4.1 and 4.0 to 4.1) were proven with user data preserved and working recovery on the upgraded system, and a signed release evidence bundle was produced. The 45-minute concurrent stress run completed with a clean load; its only failures were the account-gated Grok probe and one transient SQLite lock on a read under full CPU saturation, so it is waived rather than passed. QXL guests can show gpu-verify-failed; that is the known VM caveat, not an installed-desktop failure.
Seven changes in 4.1 break working setups.
A mission created without --provider now fails where more than one provider is ready for its capability. An approval recorded before this release stops covering a networked mission and has to be granted again. --net allow no longer reaches anything on the host, including loopback services an agent may have depended on. shadowfetch-update is now a shim over fireproof. A workspace root owned by another user is refused at the boundary. Read the release notes before upgrading, not after.
The health header reports system units.
Control Center’s system check does not summarize user services or vendor application health. Inspect those separately when diagnosing desktop problems. In an earlier candidate’s installed Ice test, the corrected DrKonqi pickup exited successfully after 61.499 seconds; its launcher socket and empty system/user failed-unit lists passed a same-boot check 1,977.751 seconds after pickup start, beyond 30 minutes. The correction targets upstream 6.6.5-3 and retains its runtime guard and per-crash path. Future KDE changes need compatibility validation; no global APT hold or pin is applied.
Grok Bot needs an eligible cloud account and plan.
The installer verifies the native package and launcher. Candidate8 initially opened the official sign-in screen; a later observation displayed ‘Can’t Reach Grok Bot’s Computer’ and Retry before authentication. The same transition was recorded on candidate7 and an earlier candidate. Its cause has not been established. Account access and cloud task execution remain unverified vendor-controlled states. API keys do not replace native sign-in. Grok Bot installation and launch pause in Ice.
Mission recovery has a local boundary.
Review result files and tests. Local restore refuses newer workspace conflicts; it cannot reverse external effects from an approved network action. Interrupted work requires attention or retry, and a missing checkpoint cannot be restored automatically.
Secure Boot is not signed.
The ISO has no Microsoft-trusted shim. If the USB does not appear or refuses to boot, disable Secure Boot in firmware before installing. That is a firmware setting, not an installer checkbox.
Debian testing can move underneath us.
Most packages come from upstream Debian testing. Update behavior can change faster than on Debian stable. Fireproof reviews and simulates before it takes the dpkg lock; it does not make testing into stable.
Fireproof is a review-and-rollback path, not unattended updates.
It simulates the upgrade, flags risky removals, and relies on Phoenix/snapper snapshots on a Btrfs root. It will not download or install in the background. Rollback needs those snapshots and free space. An ext4 install does not get the same Phoenix Points.
Virtual graphics validation is not a hardware support matrix.
A virtual desktop screenshot and software-rendered GLX or Vulkan probe do not prove physical graphics performance. Consult the current release evidence for the machines and rendering paths actually tested. NVIDIA, AMD, Intel, hybrid-laptop, and unusual-firmware performance can still need hardware-specific validation.
The live desktop can start slowly with virtual graphics.
An earlier 4.0 development ISO’s live desktop reached the splash service’s timeout after 40.119 seconds in a 4 GiB UEFI virtual machine using QXL. Plasma subsequently became usable and Calamares completed. After installation and normal password login, the splash completed successfully in 35.207 seconds. The original live failure remains in the evidence; it is not rewritten as an installed-session pass. Timing alone does not establish a graphics cause or predict physical-hardware behavior.
Heavy disk pressure affects task completion.
Earlier development stress runs exposed mission-review contention, container timeouts and vendor service failures under sustained disk pressure. Their failed results remain in the evidence. The new image adds review coordination and bounded dirty-memory writeback; the completed candidate6 tests retained relay HTTP503 responses and a container deadline failure. Those failed runs remain historical evidence. Revised-release verification is pending after the approved removal of Buzz and local AI. The ordinary mission budget is 15 minutes. Checkpoints and durable state writes count toward that budget; the limit is checked cooperatively and is not a hard wall-clock termination guarantee. Disk-latency warnings are recorded separately from actual task or service failures.
No model or cloud credential is bundled.
The ISO ships no model weights, API keys or account sessions. An on-device provider ships, but with no weights bundled it reports installed-unavailable until you supply a model service of your own. Official native Grok Bot, Codex, Claude Code, Grok Build and Cursor Agent are separate optional installs with their own sign-in.
A fresh-install test does not prove every historical upgrade path.
The earlier candidate6 test of a 3.5 installation completed four boots through upgrade to 4.0, Phoenix rollback to 3.5 and re-upgrade to 4.0. Both historical upgrade phases matched their exact 16 target package hashes. The final revised release still requires its own upgrade and rollback validation. A QA project sentinel, the separate home subvolume and machine identity were preserved; this does not prove preservation of every arbitrary user file or an upgrade from every historical version. Phoenix requires a supported Btrfs layout, available snapshots and free space.
The on-device provider ships, but it is not usable end to end out of the box.
Buzz setup and model verification are removed. Code and source-report missions require configured Codex cloud access and explicit network approval. Offline workspaces and deterministic media exports remain available.
The wider limits of what Shadowfetch does and does not claim are on thesecurity model page. Hardware notes that we can stand behind are on hardware.
Before reporting a bug
- Record the exact ISO filename and whether the checksum matched.
- Note UEFI vs legacy BIOS, Secure Boot state, CPU/GPU, RAM, and disk layout.
- For install failures, include where Calamares stopped and whether the live session worked.
- Run
shadowfetch-health --jsonand attach the report after removing anything you consider private. - For browser migration problems, note the source browser, export format, and the assistant's validation result. Never attach a password CSV.
Then emaillinux@shadowfetchlinux.orgor open a GitHub issueon ShadowfetchLinux/shadowfetch-linux. Please do not attach a password CSV.