Security advisory · 4.x installs
Earlier ISOs shipped a shared DKMS module-signing key
Building the ISO ran DKMS (for v4l2loopback-dkms), which generated/var/lib/dkms/mok.key and mok.pub, and the private key shipped in the image. Every install from the same ISO has the same key, and anyone with that ISO can extract it. Confirmed in 4.1.0; 4.0.0 and earlier releases were built the same way, so treat them as affected too.
The key only matters if you enrolled its certificate in Secure Boot:shadowfetch-gpu offers that enrolment on Secure Boot machines, and you may also have run mokutil --import /var/lib/dkms/mok.pub yourself. In that case, anyone with the ISO could sign a kernel module that your machine would trust. The 5.0.0 image is built without the key: each machine generates its own the first time DKMS builds a module. Existing installs keep the old key until you replace it.
If sudo mokutil --test-key /var/lib/dkms/mok.pub says the key is already enrolled:
sudo mokutil --delete /var/lib/dkms/mok.pub # choose a one-time password
sudo rm /var/lib/dkms/mok.key /var/lib/dkms/mok.pub
dkms status # for each <module>/<version>:
sudo dkms build --force <module>/<version> && sudo dkms install --force <module>/<version>
sudo mokutil --import /var/lib/dkms/mok.pub # the new per-machine keyReboot. In MOK Manager, choose Delete MOK and then Enroll MOK. If the key is not enrolled, you do not need to take any action; deleting the two files is still a good idea.
After upgrading a 4.x system to 5.0, shadowfetch-doctor reports the shared key as a sec.dkms_mok failure with these steps, and a one-time desktop notice at login points to them.
Earlier ISOs also shipped a shared ssl-cert-snakeoil TLS key; 5.0.0 installs generate their own on first boot. If you pointed a service at the snakeoil key, runsudo make-ssl-cert generate-default-snakeoil --force-overwrite.